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Abstract
This paper considers the problem of an imperfectly informed regulator constrained in
his choice of environmental regulation by the political opposition of those aected by the
policy. We compare the value of two types of information to the regulator: the social cost of
pollution and the protability of rms present in the economy. We nd that in environments
where small increases in the losses to regulated rms greatly aect the regulator's ability to
implement the policy, it is most valuable to learn the types of rms, while it is most valuable
to learn the social cost of pollution when small increases in losses are relatively ineectual.
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11 Introduction
We consider the policy choice of an imperfectly informed regulator constrained by the ability
of market participants to block regulation. We then compare the values of two dierent types
of information about market participants to the regulator, the social cost of pollution, and the
protability of rms present in the economy.
Determining when the regulator would prefer learning the social cost of pollution to learning
about rm protability is important for three reasons. First, cost-benet analysis has long held
the status as the fundamental yardstick in policymaking, though perhaps by default. As Richard
Posner argues, \My own justication for using cost-benet analysis... (is based on) ...what I
claim to be the inability of judges to get better results using any alternative approach" (Posner,
2000). The Clinton administration institutionalized the use of cost-benet analysis in public
decision making with Executive Order 12866, mandating that agencies \propose or adopt a
regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benets of the intended regulation
justify its costs" (W.J. Clinton, 1993). Consequently, public policy decisions worth billions of
dollars are made on the basis of cost-benet analysis each year. Given this, it is important to
assess the extent to which public decisions can be improved by better information. Further,
in environments with several sources of uncertainty, determining what type of information to
learn is of practical use.
Second, cost-benet analyses are notoriously inaccurate. One particularly relevant example
is the uncertainty surrounding the cost of meeting the Kyoto Protocol targets. In a study com-
paring the cost estimates from eight dierent sources, the Energy Information Administration1
nds signicant variance in estimated costs along many dimensions. For example, estimates of
annual GDP loss in the United States from meeting the targets range from 91 to 311 billion
dollars, while estimated carbon prices range from 147 to 360 1996 dollars per metric ton. Thus,
at least seven out of the eight projections are inaccurate to some degree. This wide range for
the estimates indicates that there is considerable \noise" present in cost-benet analysis. By
characterizing the value of information we address the question of how much the noise matters,
and which type of noise is most worth reducing.
Finally, regulatory agencies generally operate under some budget constraint. Allocating
scarce research funding to learning one parameter of the economic environment when learning
1Information available at the EIA Kyoto website: http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/kyoto/cost.html
2another would yield a higher return can be costly. Our study is intended to improve public
decisions by clearly laying out the conditions under which learning costs pays more than learning
benets.
To x ideas, we consider the specic case of environmental tax policy. Environmental
policy is necessarily chosen under uncertainty about both the costs (lost prot to rms) and
benets (reduced pollution) of any particular regulation. Moreover, environmental regulators
are often constrained by industry in
uence on the legislative process, making the probability
of implementation a central consideration in the choice of tax. Thus, environmental regulation
seems a useful example of our more general problem.
We nd that the value of learning costs relative to learning benets hinges on how politically
powerful rms are. We say rms are politically powerful if marginal increases in the tax have
disproportionately large eects on the regulator's ability to implement the policy. Our primary
nding is that when rms are not politically powerful, information about how costly pollution is
to consumer welfare (benets of regulation) is more valuable than information about the types
of rms in the economy (costs of regulation). On the other hand, when rms are politically
powerful, it pays more to learn precisely what types of rms are in the economy.
The intuition behind this result is best seen by considering an extreme case. If rms pos-
sess no lobbying ability and take any policy as given, all a regulator needs to know to set a
rst-best tax is how costly pollution is to consumers. However, as rms become increasingly
powerful, knowing rm types becomes more important, because the regulator now faces a trade-
o: choosing a tax high enough so that if it passes the legislative process only ecient rms
remain in production, or choosing a regulation that is more likely to pass but that leaves some
inecient rms in the market. Information about rm types helps the regulator make this trade
o optimally.
2 Literature Review
The political economy of regulation has its roots in the work of Olson (1964), Stigler (1971)
and Becker (1985). Broadly speaking, the contribution of this literature is to oer a convincing
theory of \who gets regulated and why". While Olson (1964) frames lobbying by regulated
parties as a collective choice problem, it is Stigler (1971) who rst developed a theory of the
demand for regulation. He argues that the state, which has the unique ability to \prohibit
3or compel, to take or give money," is largely at the service of well organized groups, a result
congruent with Olson's. Becker (1985) formalizes the ideas developed in the earlier papers into
a model of strategic competition among pressure (interest) groups for political in
uence.
This canonical model of regulation largely neglects the role of information and uncertainty.
Lewis (1996), the foundation of the present work, remedies this by introducing regulatory un-
certainty into the Becker model. Lewis' model incorporates the political constraints of Olson
and Becker in the sense that the probability of implementing a policy decreases in the aggre-
gate losses incurred by rms. Lewis also assumes the regulator is unable to observe the type
(protability) of any particular rm in the economy, and shows that in this context a welfare
maximizing planner chooses an inecient policy. Lewis' planner would ideally shut down all
socially inecient rms, but a tax which accomplishes this objective is costly both for rms re-
maining in the industry and for rms which are forced to shut down. A lower tax, which places
a smaller burden on ecient rms, is more likely to be implemented. On the other hand, with
a lower tax, some inecient rms remain in the industry. The optimal (second best) policy is
one that does not regulate almost ecient rms but induces very inecient rms to exit. The
optimal policy is inecient in the sense that, even if the policy survives the legislative process,
rms whose prot is smaller than the externality cost they create go unregulated.
Value of Information
The statistical measure of the value of information is the expected value of an informed decision
less the expected value of the uninformed decision. To illustrate this idea,2 consider a risk-
neutral gambler who is oered the following gamble: A fair coin will be tossed once. If the
gambler predicts the side of the coin that faces up correctly, he wins a dollar, while if the
prediction is incorrect, he gets nothing. The gambler can expect to earn 50 cents from the
gamble, and so will pay at most fty cents to play. Now suppose the gambler knows that before
making his \prediction", the true outcome of the coin toss will be revealed to him. In this case
the gambler expects to earn a dollar from the gamble, because whatever the outcome of the
coin toss, he will be able to predict it correctly. In this simple example, the value of information
2See Arrow and Fisher (1973) for an early application of the value of information in economics. A more
rigorous exposition of the value of information, particularly in the context of irreversibility, is provided in Treixas
and Laont (1985)
4is fty cents: the dierence between the expected value of a fully informed decision and the
expected value of an uninformed decision.
In the context of our problem, the \gambler" is a welfare maximizing regulator with the
option to learn about either the protability of the rms present in the economy, or the cost
they impose on society, before he chooses his policy. We perform calculations analogous to the
one above in order to determine when each type of information is more valuable.
3 Model
We want to develop a simple model that incorporates uncertainty into the regulatory setting
of Becker (1985). We consider the choice of a lump sum tax by a regulator who is initially
uncertain about rms' prots and about the social cost of pollution. The regulator chooses a
tax to induce the exit of rms whose prot does not cover the social cost of production. The
implementation of the tax is less likely as the losses to rms increase. By deriving the optimal
taxes under dierent information structures we are able to determine what information is most
valuable to the regulator in dierent circumstances.
To be more precise, we consider an economy where heterogeneous rms make a binary
decision to either produce or not. Firms that produce earn some prot, and rms that do not
earn zero prot. We assume that the rms face perfectly elastic demand. Through productive
activity, rms impose a social cost (pollution) on consumers. It is assumed that, whatever this
cost is, it is the same for any type of rm. The regulator's proposed policy may be blocked by
rms, and the probability of the policy being blocked increases in the losses the tax imposes on
rms. We obtain optimal taxes and (expected) social welfare for each possible information set,
or `type' of planner, and calculate the statistical values of dierent types of information.
Formally, the set of rm types in the population is:  = fL;Hg, with population frequency
(;1 ),  2 [0;1]. The i's also describe rm prot conditional on entry, with a rm of type
i earning prot i gross of any tax. For expositional clarity we suppose that at most two rms
may operate in the economy. Let i 2 f1;2g index the realized set of rms. The sample of




















= (1   )2:
The social cost of pollution, c, takes one of two values, fcL;cHg, with population frequency
(q;1 q), q 2 [0;1]. Thus there are six possible states of the world, with representative element
s 2 S. The distribution of probability (s) over the set of states is given in table 1. A planner
who learns c will be said to \learn the social cost of pollution", while a planner who learns
(1;2) will be said to \learn rm types". This model is among the simplest in which we can
sensibly talk about more than one type of information.
Under any proposed policy, rms either pay the tax and remain in production, or exit and
pay nothing. The losses rms incur are the sum of prot forgone by rms that exit (those with
prot less than the size of the tax), and the taxes paid by rms who remain in production. The
rm's stay/exit decision is completely determined by whether prot net of the tax is positive
or negative. We assume that indierent rms exit.
To capture the idea that lobbying makes implementation uncertain we follow Lewis (1996),
and suppose that if a tax  imposes aggregate losses L on rms, the probability of the policy
being implemented is P(L), where P0(L) < 0 and P00(L) < 0. In words, as aggregate losses
increase the chances of the policy passing decrease at an increasing rate. From the planner's
perspective, Proposed policy is not implemented with certainty, so that choosing a tax is a
gamble. The political power of rms depends on the curvature of the P() function. If P() is
steep, small changes in the losses the policy imposes on rms greatly decrease the chances of
the policy being implemented. In other words, marginal changes in L are important, and in
such a case we say that rms are politically powerful.
We also assume:
Ec > H > cL  L:
H > cL means that when the planner draws the sample of rm types and the social cost of
pollution, there is strictly positive probability that at least one rm is ecient. cL  L means
that, for whatever social cost the planner has drawn, there is strictly positive probability that
the planner has drawn an inecient rm. First consider the assumption H > cL  L. These
6Table 1: Distribution of probability over states
State s Prob(s)  (s)
fL;L;cLg 2q
fL;H;cLg 2(1   )q
fH;H;cLg (1   )2q
fL;L;cHg 2(1   q)
fL;H;cHg 2(1   )(1   q)
fH;H;cHg (1   )2(1   q)
two assumptions are not restrictive in the following sense. Suppose that instead of what was
presented above, our planner draws the rms from a continuum  = [;] and social cost from
a continuum C = [c;c]. In this alternative framework, as long as  \ C 6= ; and c  , these
assumptions hold. The assumption H > cL is not necessary for the analysis, but keeps the
problem interesting. If it did not hold, production by any type of rm would be inecient.
The assumption cL  L is made because, without it, if the planner chooses to learn social
cost rst and realizes c = cL, he does not wish to set any tax; any rm draw is ecient. Finally,
if the assumption Ec > H didn't hold, a planner informed about rm types that realizes
fH;Hg would not want to set a tax regardless of what social cost of pollution he may draw.
So the assumptions cL  L and Ec > H ensure that, once partial information is obtained
there is still a role for regulation.
4 Planner's Problem
The planner's objective is to choose a tax to induce the exit of rms whose prot is no larger
than the externality they create. The planner chooses the tax taking into consideration the
information he has, and that policies are not implemented with certainty. The planner's welfare
criterion does not directly include the loss the tax imposes on rms since the tax is simply a
transfer.
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F(s) denote the optimal full information tax in state s, and G(
F(s);s) be the planner's






In contrast, an uninformed planner chooses a tax independent of the true state of the world.
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U denote the optimal uninformed tax, and G(
U;s) be the planner's payo to choosing
this tax when the true state is s. Note that here the planner may choose only one tax regardless
of what the true state is, as information about the state will not be revealed to him. We can






To calculate the value of learning the social cost of pollution or rm type (but not both),
we must state the partially informed planner's problem.
To describe how new data changes the planner's beliefs, it is convenient to use the concept
of information \partitions" . Formally, a partition of the sample space S is a collection of
subsets, or events, A1;:::;An such that [n
i=1Ai = S and \n
i=1Ai = ;. A partition groups
8Table 2: Information partition 
 induced by information about rms
Event ! Probability (!)
ffL;L;cLg;fL;L;cHgg 2
ffL;H;cLg;fL;H;cHgg 2(1   )
ffH;H;cLg;fH;H;cHgg (1   )2
realizations f1;2;cg together, and allows a planner to distinguish across, but not within
groups of realizations.
Letting 
 represent the partition and ! an event in the partition, the elements of the
partition and their population frequencies are given in table 2. Information about rm types
partitions the set of states into three disjoint sets, which the planner can distinguish from one
another. Each of these sets contains two elements, between which the planner is unable to
distinguish. In words, when the planner learns rm types he learns whether he faces two low
type rms, two high types, or one of each type. However, he does not learn whether social cost
of pollution is high or low.
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(sjs 2 !): (3)
Here the planner does not know the realization f1;2;cg exactly, but he knows that the real-
ization falls in the set !. As before, for whichever state s that the planner realizes and tax 
he chooses, the payo G(;s) is obtained. The planner thus chooses a tax  to maximize the
expected value of G(;s), given that s 2 !. Let 

(!) be the solution to this problem, the op-
timal tax under partial information about rm types. This tax balances the benet of shutting
down socially inecient rms against the cost of reducing the probability of implementation.











In words, a planner anticipating information about rm types forms an expectation over the the
information he could receive (the elements ! of the partition 
), knowing that once he obtains
9Table 3: Information partition 
c induced by cost information
Event !c Probability (!c)
ffL;L;cLg;fL;H;cLg;fH;H;cLgg q
ffL;L;cHg;fL;H;cHg;fH;H;cHgg 1   q
this information he will choose the tax that maximizes expected social welfare conditional on
his information. Note that this partially informed problem is intermediate between that which
the planner faces when fully informed and uninformed. In (3) the planner can choose one of
three taxes, one for each element of the partition. This contrasts with the fully informed and
uninformed planner's problem, where the planner chooses six taxes and one tax respectively.
When the planner learns social cost of pollution but not rm types, he learns whether the
cost of pollution is high or low, but not the types of rms that are present. Formally, information
about social cost of pollution c partitions the set of states of the world into two disjoint sets
between which the planner can distinguish. Each set contains three elements, between which
the planner can not distinguish. Letting 
c represent this partition and !c an event in 
c, table
3 gives the elements of the partition and their population frequencies.
We can now write the partial information payos when the planner learns the social cost of
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c (!c) denote the optimal tax under partial information about social cost given the









c (!c);s)(sjs 2 !c)(!c):
5 Optimal taxes
To calculate the value of the three types of information, we need to obtain the tax that maximizes
social welfare for a planner with each possible type of information: a fully informed planner,
10either type of partially informed planner, and an uninformed planner. We can then characterize
and compare the values of the dierent types of information.
We rst observe that a welfare-maximizing planner may restrict himself to choosing a tax
from fL;Hg without loss. That is, any type of planner can ignore taxes outside the set
fL;Hg when choosing the optimal tax. To see this, note rst that a planner is indierent
between taxes  = H and  2 (H;1). The former leaves a high type rm with zero prot,
and we have assumed that rms exit when they earn zero prot, while the latter set of taxes
clearly induces shut-down. Both types of rm exit for any  2 [H;1), and aggregate losses
are constant over [H;1). Notice as well that, as we have assumed cL  L, a tax of  = L
is strictly preferred by the planner to any tax  < L. Under the latter, no rms exit when
the policy is passed, while under the former low-types exit, and a planner would always like
to induce low rms to exit. Together these imply that, without any loss in generality, we need
only consider taxes  2 [L;H].
It only remains to show that the optimal tax may not lie in the open interval (L;H).
Suppose to the contrary that  2 (L;H). By decreasing the tax by " 2 (0;   L), the
planner reduces the loss directly incurred by rms while leaving rm exit decisions unchanged.
But if this is true, then the planner has increased the probability of implementing the tax policy
without changing expected welfare, contradicting the optimality of . Therefore the only taxes
we need consider are in the set fL;Hg.
We can now calculate the optimal tax in each of the six possible states in S. Letting 
F(s)
denote the optimal full information tax in state s, the optimal taxes are given in table 4.
Given the realization fL;L;cLg, the planner is indierent between any taxes that induce
low types to exit the market. Any tax at least as large as L induces low type rms to exit,
and losses incurred by the low type rms do not increase once tax exceeds L. As we can
always restrict ourselves to the set fL;Hg when looking for the optimal tax, this completes
the argument. The same argument applies to the realization fL;L;cHg.
Now consider fL;H;cLg. In this state the planner optimally shuts down the low-type
and leaves the high type unregulated. A tax of L uniquely solves this problem. In the case
of fH;H;cLg the planner would prefer to leave both rms unregulated. Under a tax of L
neither rm exits.3 For the realization fH;H;cHg the planner optimally shuts down both
3Note that for the social welfare criterion we use, the planner does not care whether or not regulation is
11Table 4: Optimal taxes in each possible state





















Table 5: Optimal taxes when the planner knows rm types only


















rms, which any tax at least as large as H does.
Finally, consider fL;H;cHg. In this case the planner faces a trade-o. On the one hand,
both of the rms are inecient, and the planner would ideally shut down both of them, which
in turn requires a high tax,  = H. However, while a high tax may shut down both rms, such
a tax imposes larger losses on rms and is less likely to be enacted than a low tax that shuts
down only the most inecient rm L. This is the essence of the lobbying problem the planner
faces. The optimal tax can be L or H depending on the importance of lobbying.
We now turn attention to the calculation of optimal taxes when the planner learns rm types
but not the social cost of pollution. Optimal taxes for each element of the relevant partition
are given in table 5.
When ffL;L;cLg;fL;L;cHgg is realized, whatever the social cost of pollution, both
rms are inecient. Any tax at least as large as L induces the rms to exit, and all such taxes
enacted in this case.
12Table 6: Optimal taxes when social cost is known















impose equal losses on the rms. Thus the optimal tax is L.
When ffL;H;cLg;fL;H;cHgg, is realized the planner faces a trade-o similar to that
when he is fully informed and the state of the world is given by fL;H;cHgg. We have assumed
that Ec > H so both rms are inecient in expectation. From the point of view of expected
eciency a high tax is strictly optimal. However, high taxes are less likely to be implemented
than low taxes, and thus the preferred tax hinges on the relative ineciencies of the two types
of rms. The more inecient the low type is relative to the high type, or equivalently, the faster
the probability of implementation decreases in losses, the greater the planner's inclination to
choose a low tax.
Last, when the realization is ffH;H;cLg;fH;H;cHgg, both rms are inecient in ex-
pectation. Given the planner's information it is optimal to regulate both rms and thus a high
tax is chosen.
We now calculate optimal taxes under the assumption that the planner knows the social
cost but not rm types. The optimal taxes under the partition induced by this information are
given in table 6.
When costs are low, i.e., ffL;L;cLg;fL;H;cLg;fH;H;cLgg is realized, only the low
type is inecient. A low tax is uniquely optimal since a high tax shuts down ecient rms.
When costs are high, ffL;L;cHg;fL;H;cHg;fH;H;cHgg is realized. If the planner
knew that the true state was an element of ffL;L;cHg;fH;H;cHgg the optimal policy would
clearly be a high tax. That the planner can not distinguish between these states and fL;H;cHg
complicates matters, because the fact that fL;H;cHg is possible forces the planner to weigh
the net benet of a low tax against the net benet of a high tax. The planner must choose
between a higher probability of implementation at the cost of eciency, and more eciency
at the cost of lower probability of implementation. If, conditional on the true state being an
element of ffL;L;cHg;fH;H;cHgg, the likelihood of drawing the realization fL;H;cHg
13is suciently high, and the probability of implementation decreases quickly enough as losses
increase, the planner will prefer a low tax to a high one.











Recalling that an uninformed planner must trade-o probability of implementation with
eciency, this condition says that when marginal changes in political resistance are important,
an uninformed planner chooses a low tax, and when marginal changes are not so important he
chooses a high tax. Of course the relative frequencies of rm types and social cost play a role
as well. For example if the probability of drawing a high type rm is suciently large relative
to the probability of drawing a low type rm (i.e.,  ! 0) it is easy to see from the above
expression that a high tax is optimal.
6 The Value of Information
In this section we use the optimal taxes derived above to determine which information is more
valuable to the planner, and when.








With this notation in place, we can state our rst proposition.
Proposition 1
1. The value of learning the types of rms, V
, is zero if rms' political power is suciently
small. Formally:
If P(2L)(L   Ec)  P(H + L)[(L   Ec) + (H   Ec)] then V = 0:
142. The value of learning social cost of pollution, V
c, is zero if the rms' political power is
suciently large. Formally:
If P(2L)(L cH)  P(H+L)[(L cH)+(H cH)]+
1   

P(2H)(H cH) then Vc = 0:
Beginning with proposition 1.1, consider an uninformed planner who optimally taxes 
U.
Suppose that once the planner learns the rm types but not social cost of pollution, the tax

U remains optimal for any possible pair of rm types. That is 
U = 
(!) for all ! 2 
.
Then, in an ex-ante sense the planner receives the same expected payo whether he is informed
about rm types or has no information at all. For parameter values such that this is true,
information about rm types can not have value. Proposition 1 provides conditions under
which the planner's optimal tax with and without information are the same. When this is the
case, information has no value.
To see when the value of information about rm types can be zero, let us rst determine
when it is strictly positive. Suppose rst that the planner only regulates the low type rm
when uninformed: 
U = L. Looking at table 5, if ! = (fH;H;cLg;fH;H;cHg) is realized,
that is, the planner learns that the sample contains two high types, the optimal tax decision is
(!) = H. Thus, with probability (1 )2 information about rm types changes the optimal
tax decision when the optimal uninformed tax is low, and in this case learning the sample must
be of value.
Now suppose an uninformed planner optimally chooses: 
U = H. Then, again looking at




is realized, then 
U = H remains optimal. In the rst case the planner is indierent over all
taxes that induce low types to exit, and in the second case, since Ec > H the planner prefers
a high tax. However, if the realization is (fL;H;cLg;fL;H;cHg), the optimal tax may be
high or low, depending on how quickly P() decreases. If P() decreases quickly, then going
from a low tax to a high tax can drastically reduce the probability of implementing the policy,
while if P() does not decrease quickly the optimal tax under this realization is high. If the
15latter is true, then for any possible realization of rm types the planner prefers a high tax. If
he also optimally chooses a high tax when he has no information, then information about rm
types can not have value, because it does not change the optimal tax. The above argument is
exactly summarized by the inequality in proposition 1.1, which simply says that a planner who
realizes ffH;Lg;cg prefers a high tax.
Example: Consider the parameterization,




where B 2 [(2H)2;1) so that P(L) is a proper probability distribution. This choice for
the function P(L) provides a convenient way to consider comparative statics with respect to
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As we noted above, the political power of rms as we have dened it here, depends on the
curvature of the P() function. If marginal changes in L are important we say that rms are
politically powerful. Changing the parameter B allows us to change how important marginal
changes in L are, holding all else xed. The way we have set up this example, small values of B
correspond to high political power, while larger values of B correspond to low political power.
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Note that the right hand side of this expression is greater than 1 by our assumption Ec > H.







 ! 1 < 1 +
H   Ec
L   Ec
In words, as the slope of P(L) gets very 
at so that marginal changes in L leave the probability
of implementation unaected, the inequality holds with certainty and the value of learning rm
16types is zero. On the other hand, it is straightforward to nd parameter values for which the
inequality does not hold. If L  0 and H  Ec, the left hand side becomes 4=3 while the
right hand side becomes 1. 
To understand proposition 1.2, note that information about social cost can only have zero
value if the planner chooses the same tax for any value of social cost he draws. Note that
information about social cost has value if 
U = H. This is true because when social cost is low
the optimal tax is  = L for any possible sample. Thus information about social cost changes
the planner's tax choice with positive probability (probability q). So for information about
social cost to have no value, the planner must optimally regulate only the low type for any
realization of social cost. In other words, the planner must tax low even in the event c = cH.
For this to be true, lobbying must be very important. Indeed, the inequality in proposition 1.2
says that when the planner does not know rm types but knows that social cost is high, he
prefers a low tax.
Example cont'd Continuing with the parameterization given above, proposition 1.2 says
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and the inequality thus approaches:
0  H   cH
and as we have assumed H < cH, the inequality does not hold. This is indeed consistent with
proposition 1.2, as it shows that when rm political power becomes arbitrarily small the value
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(L   cH) + (H   cH)

This inequality holds for certain parameter values. One example of where it does hold is when
L  0 and H  cH. 
Proposition 2
1. Learning the social cost of pollution yields the expected full information payo if rms'
political power is suciently small. Formally:
If p(2L)(L   cH)  p(H + L)[(L   cH) + (H   cH)] then Vc = VF:
2. Learning only the types of rms never yields the expected full information payo. That is,
V < VF:
For information about social cost of pollution to yield the full information payo, learning
rm types once social cost is known must not change the planner's tax choice in any state
of the world. Similarly, for information about rm types to yield the full information payo,
learning social cost once rm types are known must not change the planner's tax choice in
any state of the world. Let us rst establish that learning rm types can never yield the full
information payo. To see this, note that if the planner learns that both rms are high types,
i.e., f(H;H;cL);(H;H;cH)g is realized, the planner would strictly prefer to leave the rms
unregulated if the true social cost of pollution is cL, but would optimally regulate them if
true social cost of pollution is cH. So in an ex-ante sense, regardless of the parameter values,
learning  does not yield the full information payo. The planner knows that there is positive
probability of drawing a sample of rm types such that it will still pay to learn social cost.
18Learning social cost of pollution can yield the full information payo, however. To see this,
note rst that the optimal tax does not vary across the states fL;L;cLg;fL;H;cLg;fH;H;cLg;
once the planner observes that social cost of pollution is low, regardless of what the types of
rms are, a low tax is optimal. Now suppose that c = cH. The three possible states of the
world are then:
fL;L;cHg;fL;H;cHg;fH;H;cHg
In the rst and last case a high tax is optimal. However, for a mixed sample the level of the
tax depends on how quickly P() decreases, or how likely the policy is to pass. If lobbying is
not important, the planner would choose to regulate both rms, and set a high tax. If this is
true, then there is a unique optimal tax across all possible rm pairs for each possible level of
social cost, and learning c yields the full information payo.
Example cont'd After some re-arranging, under the parameterization above proposition 2.1












Clearly, as B becomes arbitrarily large the inequality holds. In words, as the function P(L) be-
comes arbitrarily 
at and marginal changes in L do not aect the probability of implementation,
learning the social cost of pollution yields the full information payo. 
Corollary: Marginal value of information
1. Learning rm types after social cost is known is of no value if rm political power is
suciently small.
2. Information about social cost always has value when rm types are known.
The \marginal" values of information, (i.e., what the planner would pay to learn social cost of
pollution after information about rm types has been obtained, and vice versa) also depends
on how important lobbying is. When rms possess signicant political power, both marginal
values are strictly positive. This is the same as saying that when lobbying is very important,
learning only one type of information is not enough for a rst-best solution. When lobbying is
19not important, it is always worthwhile to learn c after learning rm types, but it may be of no
value to learn the sample after learning c.
Whether or not the marginal value to either type of information is positive follows im-
mediately from our discussion about whether partial information can yield the expected full
information payo. We noted that once the types of rms have been observed the planner is
always willing to pay for information about the social cost of pollution. Thus the marginal value
of information is always positive in this case. We also noted that if lobbying is not important,
information about social cost of pollution yields the expected full information payo, and thus
the marginal value of information is zero. However if lobbying is important, partial information
about social cost can't yield the expected full information payo, and the marginal value of
information is positive.
7 Conclusion
We model an economy where a regulator chooses optimal environmental regulation in the pres-
ence of political constraints and hidden information. We use the model to compare the relative
values of information about the social cost of pollution and the types of rms present in the
economy. We nd that in environments where rms are politically powerful, it pays a regulator
most to learn the types of rms. On the other hand, when rms are not politically powerful,
it pays most to learn the social cost of pollution. While we present our results using a deliber-
ately simple model, this intuition is general. Indeed, the main results appear to generalize to
an environment with many rm types and levels of social costs.
The relative values of information hinge on the political power of rms because, when
the probability of implementing a policy is not sensitive to the losses that rms incur as a
consequence of the policy, choosing the optimal regulation amounts to setting the tax to equal
the externality (pollution) cost of production. This is the rst best tax, and so information
about social cost of pollution is much more valuable to this end than is information about rm
types. On the other hand, when a high tax is much less likely to be implemented than a low tax,
a welfare-maximizing planner would treat a sample of high prot, inecient rms dierently
from a mixed sample of high and low prot inecient rms. In the latter case there is more
surplus at stake from not passing the policy. Information about rm types is more valuable in
this instance. To say this another way, information about rm types allows the regulator to
20choose regulation that aects only rms that are less able to in
uence the political process. In
an environment where marginal changes in political resistance are important, this means that
information about rm type can be very valuable. If marginal changes in political resistance
are not important, information that leads to the rst best, i.e., information about social cost,
is more valuable.
Relaxing the assumption of binary production choice and allowing rms to choose quantity in
the context of the model we present here comes at great cost in terms of tractability and clarity,
and generates small benet in intuition over and above the propositions we have discussed here.
Finding the correct way to extend the model in this direction without losing the simplicity
inherent to the binary setup remains a subject for future research.
Given the results we have obtained here, the conclusions of Olson (1982), Becker (1985) and
Stigler (1971) suggest that when a regulator is facing a concentrated industry he would do well
to learn rm types as opposed to the true social cost of pollution, as concentrated industries
are conducive to rm mobilization. In other words, the probability of implementing policy is
a concern and lobbying is important. When lobbying is important, being able to distinguish
what types of rms the planner is facing is relatively valuable. This allows the planner to infer
the probability of implementing policy more precisely. On the other hand, if the regulator
nds himself in an industry with many small rms that can not organize eectively, learning
the social cost of pollution is preferable, because the benet from getting the tax closer to the
actual cost of pollution outweighs the cost from potentially not implementing the tax.
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Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 asserts that under some conditions on the parameters the value to either type
of information is zero. To prove this result, we need only show that when these conditions hold,
the uninformed planner's optimal tax choice is the same as the tax choice of a planner that has
the information in question. We prove each of of proposition 1.1 and 1.2 in turn.
First we show that:
p(2L)(L   Ec)  p(H + L)[(L   Ec) + (H   Ec)] ) V = 0:
Note rst that if the parameters satisfy:
p(2L)(L   Ec)  p(H + L)[(L   Ec) + (H   Ec)];
then looking at Table 5, for the realization ffL;H;cLg;fL;H;cHgg the planner prefers
a high tax. This then implies that a high tax is optimal for any of the three samples that are
possible when the planner gains information about rm types. Further,
p(2L)(L   Ec)  p(H + L)[(L   Ec) + (H   Ec)]




which implies that the planner prefers a high tax with no information. Altogether, the
planner prefers a high tax with no information, and chooses a high tax for any of the three
possible realizations when he gains information about rm types. There can not be a value to
learning rm types.
Now we show that:
p(2L)(L   cH)  p(H + L)[(L   cH) + (H   cH)] +
1   

p(2H)(H   cH) ) Vc = 0
First, from table 6, if




then the planner chooses a low tax even when the social cost is high. Then, for either realization
of social cost, the optimal tax is low.
22Further,








and thus an uninformed planner optimally taxes low. Altogether, a planner taxes low for
either realization when information about social cost is gained, but taxes low when he has no
information anyways. The value of learning social cost can't be positive. 
Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2.1 establishes conditions under which learning only the social cost of pollution
leaves the planner as well o as if he would be with full information. To prove this we need to
show that, for each possible level of social cost, once information about social cost is obtained,
learning the types of rms would not change the planner's choice of tax.
Now suppose
p(2L)(L   cH)  p(H + L)[(L   cH) + (H   cH)]
Note that (see table 4) if the parameter values satisfy this condition a fully informed planner
regulates both types for the realization fL;H;cHg. This implies that a high tax is always
optimal when c = cH, regardless of rm types. Further, we know that if c = cL a low tax
is always optimal. Thus once the planner knows the social cost, learning rm types does not
change his choice of tax regardless of the types, and thus does not change his ex-post payo.
Information about social cost yields the full information payo.
We now prove proposition 2.1, that information about rm types can never yield the full
information payo:
V 6= VF
To prove this, we need nd only one possible realization of rm types such that learning
social cost in addition to information about rm types changes the planner's tax choice. If we
can nd such a case, information about rm types can't yield full information payo, because
the planner's ex-post payo can change with more information. So consider the realization
ffH;H;cLg;fH;H;cHgg
23In this case, without further information the planner chooses a high tax, as both rms are
inecient in expectation. However, if the planner were to learn that the true social cost is cL,
a low tax would be strictly preferable, as both rms are ecient. Thus information about rm
types alone can't provide full information payo.
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